A few thoughts at the intersection of Posthumanism and Ethics.
The traditional view has it that any non-human animal:
Descartes, Aristotle, and most other famous philosophers have advanced such views. If you believe that Free Will is essential to morality (that choice is an essential component of morality), then the lack of decision-making abilities (in an animal) means that morality isn't at play (correspondingly) - they've been mostly viewed as amoral, mindless, animate objects.
Even in cases where evil is attributed to non-human animal events (consider the Plague of Locusts of Biblical lore) by theologians, we've been loath to attribute evil directly to the species (and/or directly to members of that species).
By contrast, human cultural folklore has it that many animals can be intrinsically or inherently evil. Often creatures of myth and lore.
A brief historical point of clarification that I've alluded to:
Posthumanism continues in the spirit of Humanism but believes the task of Humanism is incomplete - we've ignored all the other animals and thinking beings.
I've discussed Posthumanism a bit. Briefly, I summarize the collection of similar views that fall under that heading as the view:
If one believes that cruelty to animals is unjust and/or immoral because one has violated the happiness, and intrinsic rights, or caused internal suffering to an animal, they are likely a posthumanist. (One could still defend criminalizing cruelty to animals on the basis of public safety considerations or opposing some vice-like human behavior and not necessarily be a posthumanist.)
If Posthumanism implies that all have moral worth, does that also imply that some animals can be evil?
Is there a tension here, in the above two observations?
So, in extending our moral norms between species we are extending some species-specific moral norm(s) between two species (and saying they are both judged and morally equivalent under those norms).
That would seem to imply that other animals should, will, or can be judged as evil (against the reigning hesitance to do so). Some animal behaviors are clearly errant or random (say, a dog attacking their pet owner/caretaker). Some animal behaviors appear to be clearly errant and intrinsic to an animal's normal biological development.
Or, in taking the other horn, perhaps Posthumanism might be untenable since no species-neutral moral perspective can be uniformly and fairly applied to all relevant animals.
Is the above argument sound and valid? I lean toward Posthumanism (especially if I am forced to choose between Posthumanism and Transhumanism). Context: I'm a vegetarian who gave up my favorite foods years ago.
Per 7., Is there a wider question here too? Can a single moral perspective (say that of a specific species) ever justifiably be applied between two or more species? (Must all justified ascriptions of evil be relative to a single moral "frame of reference" - e.g. on the basis of something like Aristotelian Animalism.)
For instance, it's been empirically shown that avian rationality shares many overlapping features with human rationality but that the two differ greatly. Birds, for instance, have a single cranial "hemisphere". (What about species that have three or more?) Is the Kantian notion of universal rationality itself not suspicious as an anthropomorphic theory?