In thinking about Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, is it useful to think further about commitment to norms?
Under which conditions do norms lose their "power"? We might better articulate this question in the following ways:
Consider, for example, laws that no one enforces or follows.
Consider languages that are in complete disuse, each of their grammatical rules abandoned (though they exist in ancient textbooks).
Below, we will consider these questions through the lens of Norm Commitment and attempt to define this more robustly.
Given the following kind of expression in a Deontic Modal Logic:
We might append a number Φ ∈ [0,1] representing degree of commitment to that moral expression. For example:
I don't think this is merely a mathematical construction, we see varying degrees of commitment to norms all the time. Whether in law, religion, or elsewhere.
This small technical extension added to the basic edifice Deontic Modal Logic gives us the ability to understand norms more fully.
I think this technical edifice can be used to supplement certain applied considerations in the sub-discipline called Practical Philosophy (which is primarily interested in modelling instrumental reasoning and theories of motivation backed by science).
Motivation, at least with respect to norm commitment, can be partly modelled using these simple techniques and linked to the perhaps more interesting theories of motivation elsewhere.
It's particularly interesting to think about motivation but coming at it from the other angle:
If there were perfect norm commitment, would we be concerned with motivation at all?