Sign, Identity, Relations #3

Random thoughts on Objects, Objecthood, and Parts.

Inverting Atomicity

When one talks about Objects in academic philosophy, one nearly invariably (and implicitly) endorses:

1. Philosophical Atoms are more primitive than their Aggregates or Complex compounds. Primitive here entails, less structure (internally), a lack of Proper Parts, being most basic, etc. (This is akin to Downward Dependence rules/type talk within Computer Science SOLID ontologies.)
2. Philosophical Atoms are typically found inside Aggregates or Complex compounds (or on their own otherwise).

Let's see what happens if we reject one of the two theses above.

Basic Entities Encapsulate Complex Ones

Let's try out the idea that a primary, basic-most entity (philosophical Atom), encapsulates more Complex things. A Basic thing would enshield, enwrap, or surround something of greater Complexity within (although such Complexity would not itself part of the Atom itself since it is basic-most).

On the ancient view, this would imply that the most basic thing was on the outside and so the Complex entity could not be destroyed since it’s philosophically Atomic and acting as "shield" of sorts around it.

If done repeatedly, it’d imply infinite complexity within but not part of an Atom.

Objection: How can a basic-most Object have internal complexity?

The idea is that the Object is analogous to the surface, skin - it's primitive but can cover (philosphical Atoms can presumable interact with the Physical world despite their being basic-most - by what principled argument/reason would enwrapping be exluded). And, indeed, there are some mathematical examples of this kind of wrapping relationship - for ontological primitive of their respective theories (e.g. - in Sheaf-Topos Theory).

In short: why must philosophical Atoms be understood as Points? What happens if we invert the ancient conception of ontology and its fundamental relationships?

Further Critique of Quiddities

Some further criticisms of the ancient notion of primitive "thisness":

1. Claim A: That there are this and that (fundamental essences, quiddities or haecceities, that make something distinctly what it is most fundamentally - often likened to a pincushion into which characteristics, features, properties affix) requires something like a "boundary" to differentiate the two properties.
2. Claim B: That Objects are individuated by primitive quiddities or haecceities does not entail non-overlap.

On Claim A: Paralleling Bradley's Regress (against Universals). That one this is distinct from another this requies something "distinctive" between the two. But that "distinctiveness" appears to lead to a vicious and untenable infinite regress. This can be run meta-schematically against all such patterned theories.

On Claim B: A fortiori nothing intrinsic to this entails Spatio-Temporal boundaries (in fact Spatio-Temporal properties are usually considered to depend on some more primitive notion of thisness in the first place). That one this is distinct from another this requires something "distinctive" between the two. But that "distinctiveness" again appears to lead to a vicious and untenable infinite regress.

Fundamental essences, quiddities, or haecceities shouldn't be confused with the this Keyword of many programming languages - the former are taken to be ontic properties (and the very ones that make something distinctly what it is) whereas the latter is a linguistic Keyword - it's a monniker, reference, or handle to the relevant Scope, Closure, Class, Function, or Method. Indeed, individuation comparisons are typically performed through Referential Comparison (comparison by Address Reference in Volatile Memory) in most programming languages not by recourse to some "mystical" or ineffable substance.